|
Neglecting the
documentation of political experiences in the Arab world is a
major deficiency from which political decisions and stands badly
suffer. The majority of politicians and activists ignore
recording their personal experiences depending on memory and
waiting for the “right time” to publish. Often the “right time”
does not materialise during the lifetime of the person. Others
choose to keep the information to themselves with the intention of
including it in future memoirs, only to discover later that the
amount of valuable information in their possession is insufficient
for a book of an appropriate size. Whatever the reasoning,
the result is the loss of pieces of vital material essential for
building informed opinion.
Due to these failings and
lack of credible archive centres in our region, one is forced to
rely on rumours and conflicting stories to provide the necessary
material to reinforce his case when confronting political abuse or
defending a national issue.
The evident unconvincing
stature of some of the Arab political opposition groupings clearly
reflects the quality of information held by the concerned people.
Worse still are the analysis by the ordinary citizen who has no
credible information at his disposal to make sound judgements to
adopt or reject given stands. Decisions built on rumours and
well-travelled stories make the citizen his own and the country’s
worst enemy.
As the Chinese proverb
says “better to light a candle than to curse the darkness”,
I decided to place the modest information I learnt over the past
25 years, while serving our Libyan case, in the domain of history
through this free medium in the hope that it may aid others who
may wish to participate in serving the national cause. Sharing
this type of information will doubtless help Libyans make sense of
perplexing but crucial events.
I select to start this
initiative by giving a brief summary of the series of meetings I
had during 1982 and 84 with officials from the American
administration who were directly responsible for Libyan-American
affairs. I wish to add that the meetings were not conducted on
conditions of secrecy.
I agreed to participate in
the series of meetings out of my ever eagerness to present my
country’s case and solicit support to help the Libyan people rid
themselves of the dreadful injustices and oppression they suffered
since 1st Sept 1969. No doubt the USA have the means
to both cause harm as well as end it, and that it has vital
interests in Libya.
A series of lengthy
meetings with US officials in 1982 started after initiatives on
their part in an Arab capital. These meetings moved on to
Washington and later returned to the capital where they started
and later ended. In the opening of the first meeting, the veteran
Arthur Niner interrupted it to greet me with a warm welcome and a
firm hand shake and commented on the idea of the Libyan
Constitutional Union saying “I salute the style”, adding
that he would follow progress of the meetings and talks through
reports that would reach him regularly from his colleagues, whom
he hoped that I would listen to and cooperate with. Over a
three-month period I had several discussions (a total of some 20
hours), with periods of interruption where I had to return to
Manchester to consult my colleagues in the LCU. I ensured that
travel and accommodation expenses were from my own budget.
Chats during coffee and
lunch breaks outside the formal meetings, invariably focused on
attempting to see whether the long-term implications of the LCU
concept, the variety of benefits it brought to Libya, the probable
ramifications in the region, and the impossibility of opposing
this movement publicly in the free world, came accidentally or
were the result of deliberate planning. They were also very keen
to know whether the LCU was created, sponsored or supported by
Britain. I found that I had to repeat several times my assurances
that the British had absolutely no interest in us.
They were astonished by
our intention to bring together exiled Libyan dignitaries
(including former prime ministers, ministers, elected members of
parliament and heads of communities and other prominent and
intellectual Libyans) to establish a national committee analogous
to the national assembly which formulated the Libyan Constitution
in 1951. The assembly we had in mind would begin by publicly
renewing allegiance to the King as we (LCU) had done. The second
stage of our initiative was for His Majesty to form from its
members a government in exile that would gain its international
recognition and national legitimacy from his constitutional status
that could never be annulled by a military coup d'état. The
government in exile would go on to demand regaining the Libyan
seat in the United Nations and Libya’s properties used by the
military coup as embassies, and use them as offices of the new
structure in countries which respect international law and
appreciate constitutional legitimacy.
The American team found
such a precedent somewhat too much for the Libyans and were unable
to hide their disapproval of the King playing a role in a future
Libya. After additional exchanges of views and future visions, we
reached a dead end and, with not mild hard feelings, parted
company. I clearly understood that the Americans’ intention were
not sincere in changing the situation in Libya. As for the LCU,
it was apparent that it confused their plans and our surfacing to
the arena was not a welcome surprise. I understood through
various phases of the talks that the Libyan and the American
priorities did not exactly go hand in hand. Libya’s interests did
not in fact rank even a distant second position.
Before parting company, I
was offered an expert position in the Middle Eastern Affairs
office in the US State Department for a handsome annual salary and
extensive facilities on condition that I leave the UK and never
return. The suggestion was that my activities would move to where
the US State Department decided. There was also a hint to the
possibility of cooperation in the future to allow some
constitutional gains in Libya after existing American schemes have
completed their course.
When I responded to the
person I was talking to, that I could not see anyone in the
American Administration worthy of being my superior, he confirmed
with a great deal of determination and absolute resolve that I
would find all Arab doors closed in my face and the vast majority
of prominent and influential Libyan personalities would
ferociously block my way and become personal enemies. Later years
confirmed that he meant what he said precisely. The LCU was
forced to play its role in the Libyan case alone and without help
from any quarter. It made painfully slow but firm progress
against much opposition. Further, it made a distinguished impact
on the Libyan case and coloured the national struggle with
distinctive marks that originate from our unique national
legacies. It revived and re-affirmed concepts and principles
many believed they had succeeded in burying and for ever deprived
the Libyan people of.
During that period, we
witnessed, with immense distress, America’s “friends” in the
Libyan opposition fully engaged in attempting to implement the
very plans we had decisively rejected, and painfully watched the
certain failure we had anticipated.
With immense sorrow we
watched the uprising of the cream of the Libyan society
deliberately being contained into a frame that progressively led
it to the land of depressing disappointment and wasteful
destruction of much promising potential. No one was prepared to
listen to our warnings. Influenced by an over simplified
calculation and an imaginary rapid victory, colleagues abstained
from hearing our calls for reassessment.
America’s “friends” in the
opposition tried more than once to re-package the constitutional
principle and marginalize the LCU. Attempts failed because of
lack of constitutional understanding and conviction.
In 1984 we were encouraged
by a courtesy letter from the US State Department to consider
re-starting talks. The letter, dated 3rd August 1984,
was from the Director of the Office of North African Affairs, who
stated that he was writing on instructions from Mr. James Baker
(then White House Chief of Staff).
He also wrote that he regretted that I did not find recent
meetings with U.S government officials satisfactory.
After much deliberation
the decision was made to re-start talks. I travelled to
Washington on December 2nd , 1984. On December 6th
I met a gentleman I had not known previously. He was fully
informed of the details of the previous meetings. He introduced
himself by, I suspect, a pseudonym, as the head of the bureau
responsible for the Libyan case. He made clear that he was quite
independent from the White House and that he did not belong to the
State Department but refused to acknowledge that he worked for the
CIA. After several hours of talks we reached the same dead end as
in 1982. The man was obviously relieved by this outcome and
admitted that he had wished for this conclusion and in fact only
met with me to please the White House (meaning Mr James Baker).
He added that his department would never deal with the LCU unless
forced, despite the fact that it is (in his view) the only Libyan
organisation worthy of recognition. He went on to elaborate that
this was because success of the LCU concept would make an
encouraging precedent in the region, the very thing his bureau had
been making sure would never happen since the 1940s. These
concerns, the gentleman suggested, were missing from the White
House. However, he volunteered to offer a limited conditional
assistance to the LCU to oblige the White House, which according
to him, had asked his department more than once to “aid Mohammed”
(meaning myself). The condition for aid was that it would not be
of a political nature. It was clear to me that he was drawing me
toward a defiant response similar to my reaction in 1982 in order
to end the meeting with a sour note from my part. This, I
suspected, would relieve him from the responsibility of
contradicting the instruction from the White House. I resisted
being drawn and did not see refusing the initiative from the White
House would be in the interest of the national Libyan case. I
went on to request that they put us, with recommendations, in
touch with one of the American Organisations involved in spreading
democracy in the world to finance establishing a centre for the
LCU equipped with communication and promotional facilities and
with adequate protection from Gaddafi’s terrorist activities. The
centre, I explained, would enable us to more effectively spread
the constitutional awareness that had been erased by the machinery
of Gaddafi’s regime until times improved in favour of our case.
He refused. But went on to say that I held all the winning cards
in the game but my own people let me down. Adding that, had the
exiled Libyans donated just the coins in the piggy banks of their
children, he (Bureau) would not only have found himself forced to
cooperate with me, but would actually be compelled to serve me
because he could not want to appear to the American public to be
against a case such as this one. He went on to say that they (the
Libyans) had no taste for this advanced standard which must be
forcefully claimed by nations, not handed over as a gift. He made
clear that he would not spend the American taxpayers funds to hand
the Libyans an honour they do not deserve. He went on to present
an alternative offer. His department would finance me and guide
my steps to publish a periodical from which I would keep the
profits on condition that they (his bureau) would oversee the
activities, approve all publications and that I stay away from the
Libyan case. I refrained from responding and quickly changed the
subject to end the meeting by recording my misgivings about their
Libyan policy and my fears from it. I stated that I was alarmed
by the fact that the rapid deterioration in the Libyan
infrastructure was not happening by accident. The revival of
tribalism which was promoted as an alternative to the state’s
infrastructure could easily be manipulated to turn into an
inflammatory and uncontrollable security nightmare. I was
suspicious of the insistence shown by America’s “friends” in the
Libyan opposition on dismissing the gravity of this trend, refusal
to acknowledge the problem and silencing voices that may attempt
to highlight it[2].
I wondered (to the
gentleman) what were the crimes committed by the Libyans against
the American people to earn such intense enmity.
I had not been prepared
for the reaction that followed. The confident and aloof man lost
his temper. I had obviously touched a raw nerve and clearly
surprised him. He was aware of what I was describing including
details and likely consequences. However, he had not expected me
to see through the events and figure out seemingly accidental
developments. In his outburst, the gentleman volunteered much, a
great deal of which, I am certain, he had not intended to reveal.
The only part I wish to record here is that he challengingly
endorsed what had been said adding that he personally believed
that a blood bath was what the Libyans needed to wash off their
idleness and vanity to become worthy of the wealth that exploded
under their feet undeservedly. He defied me to change any of the
set plans or alter their course. The White House, he noted,
should find their own route to deal with me if they insist on
doing so.
I left the meeting and
headed for the nearest travel office. I left Washington on
December 7th 1984.
I share these experiences
in the belief that the information concerns all. Changing the
course of events in Libya’s national interest is a duty for all.
[2]
“A group of them flocked to the office of “Asharq Al-Awsat” in
London to protest the newspaper’s publishing on 10 July 1992
of an interview in which I raised concerns about the
possibility of the outbreak of civil war in Libya”
|
